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9	CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD			
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11	ENFORCEMENT ACTION ENF01949 SWRCB Enforcement Action DRAFT CEASE AND DESIST ORDER FNF01951 and FNF01949			
12	DRAFT CEASE AND DESIST ORDER REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS OR THREATENED BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION			
13	UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS OF WATER DISTRICT'S OPPOSITION TO THE FROM OLD RIVER IN SAN JOAQUIN			
14	RESOURCES' MOTION FOR			
15	In the Matter of ENFORCEMENT ACTION ENF01951 – ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL LIABILITY COMPLAINT REGARDING			
16	UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSION OF WATER FROM THE INTAKE CHANNEL TO THE			
17 18	BANKS PUMPING PLANT (FORMERLY ITALIAN SLOUGH) IN CONTRA COSTA			
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Department of Water Resources (DWR) submitted the testimony of Paul Marshall (Marshall) on February 22, 2016 under the guise of rebutting direct testimony of Byron-Bethany Irrigation District's (BBID) experts. However, the testimony submitted by Marshall is almost exclusively comprised of new testimony, including extensive technical analyses, having nothing to do with rebuttal. This untimely attempt to bring new direct testimony into the case with a new expert is a blatant violation of basic rules of procedure and the Hearing Officer's orders, as extensively argued in BBID's Motion in Limine, submitted February 29, 2016. Unless and until the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) excludes Marshall from testifying, BBID must be allowed to conduct discovery on Marshall pursuant to its statutory discovery rights.

BBID immediately noticed Marshall's deposition after receipt of the new testimony. However, instead of simply producing its expert for a deposition in accordance with basic procedural rules, the Department of Water Resources (DWR) seeks a Protective Order to prevent BBID from exploring the substance and basis of Marshall's testimony in advance of the hearing. DWR complains about burden and expense and concludes that BBID should blindly cross-examine this witness during the formal hearing regardless of the prejudice to BBID's right to prepare for the hearing in advance by way of discovery it is entitled to perform.

Discovery is meant to be a liberal vehicle for finding evidence that may be helpful or harmful to a party's case in advance of the final adjudication. The idea that BBID's only opportunity to cross-examine this witness should be during the very limited amount of time permitted for cross-examination at the hearing itself is prejudicial, improper, and legally untenable. BBID respectfully requests the SWRCB prevent DWR's attempt to limit BBID's access to discoverable information in advance of the hearing and order that the Marshall deposition proceed as soon as possible and prior to the hearing. BBID

¹ BBID hereby joins in the "CDWA, SDWA, WSID Opposition to DWR Motion for Protective Order re Deposition of Paul Marshall; Supporting Declaration of Jennifer L. Spaletta" filed by Central Delta Water Agency.

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alternatively requests that the hearing be continued by at least 30 days to allow sufficient time for the parties to complete this critical discovery.

11. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In July 2015, the SWRCB issued a Draft Cease and Desist Order to the West Side Irrigation District (WSID), Enforcement Action ENF01949 (CDO), and an Administrative Civil Liability Complaint to BBID, Enforcement Action ENF01951 (ACL).

On August 19, 2015, the Hearing Team issued a pre-hearing conference order stating, "[r]ebuttal evidence is limited to evidence that is responsive to evidence presented in connection with another party's case-in-chief, and it does not include evidence that should have been presented during the case-in-chief of the party submitting rebuttal evidence." (Declaration of Michael Vergara in Support of BBID's Opposition to DWR's Motion for Protective Order; Re: Paul Marshall (Vergara Decl.). Exh. A at p. 6, \P 9(c).)²

On September 2, 2015, DWR submitted a Notice of Intent to Appear (DWR NOI) listing Marshall as the only witness. (Vergara Decl., Exh. C.)

From October 2015 through late January 2016, a lengthy discussion ensued between the parties regarding the date for Marshall's deposition. (Vergara Decl., Exh. D.) After many scheduling difficulties, the deposition was scheduled for December 30, 2015. (Ibid.) However, counsel for DWR advised that Marshall could not appear on December 30, 2015 and the parties began to discuss January 2016 dates. (*Ibid.*) On January 19, 2016, DWR submitted an Amended Notice of Intent to Appear (DWR) Amended NOI) in the BBID and WSID hearings, which removed Marshall as a witness. (Vergara Decl., Exh. E at pp. 1-3.) DWR did not add any expert witnesses. (*Ibid.*) Because DWR removed Marshall from the witness list, the parties agreed that they would not proceed with the Marshall deposition at that time. (Vergara Decl., Exh. D.) BBID never agreed to completely forego any future opportunity to depose Marshall.

² The Hearing Team repeats this admonition in its Second Pre-Hearing Conference Order, dated February 18, 2016. (Vergara Decl., Exh. B at p. 3.)

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On January 22, 2016, BBID filed expert witness testimony by Susan Paulsen (Paulsen) and WSID filed expert witness testimony by Thomas Burke (Burke). On February 22, 2016, DWR submitted Marshall's Rebuttal Testimony. (Vergara Decl., Exh. F.) Marshall purports to rebut the Paulsen and Burke testimony. BBID filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Marshall's testimony and scheduled Marshall's deposition for March 3, 2016. (Vergara Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. G.) On February 29, 2016, DWR moved for a protective order prohibiting Marshall's deposition. (Vergara Decl., ¶ 10.)

The CDO and ACL Hearing are currently set to begin on March 21, 2016.

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Parties Are Entitled to Take Depositions

Administrative hearings and discovery procedures are governed by the Water Code (Wat. Code, § 1075 et seq.) and SWRCB regulations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, §§ 648 et seq.), which incorporate portions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11400 et seq., 11513) and the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.). The Board or any party to a proceeding before the Board may take the deposition of witnesses in accordance with the Civil Discovery Act. (Wat. Code, § 1100.)

Discovery in the SWRCB's proceedings should, as in civil actions in the superior courts, be construed broadly in favor of permitting discovery. As courts have repeatedly explained, "[t]he scope of discovery [in civil actions] is very broad." (*Tien v. Superior Court* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 535.) This expansive scope of discovery "enable[s] a party to obtain evidence in the control of his adversary in order to further the efficient, economical disposition of cases according to right and justice on the merits." (*Fairfield v. Superior Court* (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 119-120.) Consistent with this purpose, the California Supreme Court has consistently held that "discovery statutes are to be construed broadly in favor of disclosure, so as to uphold the right to discovery whenever possible." (*Puerto v. Superior Court* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249 [citing *Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1107-08; *Greyhound Corp. v.*

BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S OPPOSITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES' MOTION FOR PROECTIVE ORDER; RE: PAUL MARSHALL

Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 377].)

Further, parties to an adjudicative proceeding are entitled to due process, which includes a full and fair opportunity to participate. (See, e.g., *Sallas v. Municipal Court* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 737, 742 ["due process of law requires that an accused ... have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense "] BBID is seeking no more than it is afforded by the Water Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the basic tenets of due process rights.

B. DWR's Failure to Produce Marshall for Deposition in Advance of the Hearing Is Prejudicial, in Violation of Applicable Law and the Hearing Officer's Orders

DWR argues that the Hearing Officer and the parties did not propose to conduct discovery after all written testimony and exhibits were submitted. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the Hearing Officer and parties did not contemplate submission of expert testimony with new evidence supporting its case-in-chief during the rebuttal stage. This rule was made extremely clear in the Hearing Officer's orders – rebuttal was not to be used as a back door to introducing new case-in-chief testimony. (Vergara Decl., Exh. A at p. 6, ¶ 9(c), and Exh. B at p. 5 ["Rebuttal evidence is limited to evidence that is responsive to evidence presented in connection with another party's case-in-chief, and it does not include evidence that should have been presented during the case-in-chief of the party submitting rebuttal evidence."].) Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.310(b) supports this mandate by limiting the testimony of a late disclosed expert to "the falsity or non-existence of a fact used as the foundation for any opinion by any other party's expert witness, but may not include testimony that contradicts an opinion."

DWR waited until February 22, 2016, less than a month before the hearing, to submit complex expert testimony that should have been part of its case-in-chief. This conduct is unduly prejudicial to BBID's ability to meaningfully prepare its defense.

Marshall was initially included as a case-in-chief witness in early September 2015.

(Vergara Decl., Exh. C.) After months of back and forth to set his deposition, DWR

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removed him as a witness. (Vergara Decl., Exh. E.) On the basis of DWR's decision not to utilize him as an expert, the parties opted not to proceed with his deposition in January 2016, without any waiver of their right to take the deposition. (Vergara Decl., Exh. D.)

Now, although Marshall purports to rebut the direct testimony of experts Paulsen and Burke, his testimony extends far beyond a simple rebuttal by presenting new evidence outside the scope of Paulsen's and Burke's testimony. Marshall's expert testimony relies on complex technical models that employ large data sets to reach conclusions and opinions that DWR asserts are useful to the Hearing Officer in this proceeding. If DWR had timely disclosed the intention of Marshall to offer case-in-chief testimony, BBID would have immediately sought the data and model runs underlying the analyses and conducted depositions to prepare rebuttal. Now, it is improbable that BBID will be able to (1) timely obtain the data, assumptions, and modeling used and relied on by Marshall; (2) analyze the data, assumptions, modeling, and expert opinions; (3) take informed expert depositions; and (4) adequately prepare to rebut the expert testimony during the hearings.

BBID has the absolute right to depose Marshall under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.410. Code of Civil Procedure, section 2034.410 provides "[o]n receipt of an expert witness list from a party, any other party may take the deposition of any person on the list." DWR is now presenting Marshall as an expert witness, and using his testimony as it intended to when Marshall was listed on the DWR NOI. DWR chose to remove Marshall from their NOI, and cannot now be permitted to introduce his case-inchief expert testimony under the guise of rebuttal to the prejudice of BBID.

Thus, if Marshall's testimony is not excluded as untimely case-in-chief expert testimony, it must, at the very least, be subject to the same opportunities for discovery as every other case-in-chief witness. (Wat. Code, § 1100.)

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C. There is No Undue Burden or Expense in Producing Expert Witnesses and Documents Relied Upon Pursuant to Statutory Discovery Procedures

DWR repeatedly complains of the "undue" burden and expense of producing Marshall and the documents he relied upon in forming his opinions. Regardless of when Marshall is deposed, the burden and expense of producing a witness and documents is a normal cost of discovery. A party cannot try to protect their witness by producing their testimony and the documents they choose, then claiming the discovery process is too burdensome. Depositions cost money for all parties involved. Notably, the expense of Marshall's deposition is not borne by DWR – it is borne by the parties taking the deposition who are required by law to pay Marshall at his normal hourly rate for his time. Presumably, DWR paid Marshall for the work performed on DWR's behalf, thus taking on the burden and expense associated with expert retention. Having opted to take on the burden and expense of an expert, DWR cannot now assert that it is an "undue" burden and expense when the parties seek to discover the precise opinions the expert was hired to render. That is patently unfair, prejudicial, and legally untenable.

Additionally, DWR is required to show the "quantum of work required" to successfully assert an undue burden and expense defense to a deposition proceeding pursuant to code. (*West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 ["The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required."]) DWR merely makes the conclusory allegation that producing Marshall and the accompanying documents would be an "undue burden and expense to DWR" and fails to supply any facts demonstrating the quantum of work required to comply with BBID's discovery requests. DWR's conclusory allegations of undue burden and expense must fail.

DWR additionally argues that it should not have to bear the burden and expense of Marshall's deposition and the accompanying production of documents so close to the hearing. Again, DWR conveniently ignores that the only reason Marshall's deposition is

scheduled for March 2016 is because DWR *chose* to withdraw Marshall from its list of case-in-chief witnesses in January. The parties had no reason to proceed with the deposition earlier. Why would the parties opt to incur the burden and expense of deposing a person who was not going to testify at the hearing? It is disingenuous for DWR to attempt to block Marshall's deposition because of its proximity to the hearing when DWR created the problem. BBID is deposing Marshall as soon as practicable, considering DWR did not designate Marshall as a witness until February 22, 2016. DWR has options that do not serve to prejudice BBID: it can seek a continuance of the hearing or simply withdraw Marshall as a witness.

D. <u>DWR's Relevance Objections Are Unfounded and Improper</u>

DWR improperly claims the documents that BBID seek are irrelevant. To the contrary, Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 provides that "any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action[.]" In an administrative hearing, relevant evidence "is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs." (Gov. Code, § 11513(c).) Although administrative adjudications follow a relaxed standard of admissibility, the evidence still "must be relevant and reliable." (Aengst v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 275, 283.) Additionally, pursuant to California Evidence Code section 350, no evidence is admissible unless it is relevant. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Relevant evidence is defined by California Evidence Code section 210 as "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 245.)

BBID requests documents related to (1) the SWRCB's determination of water availability in the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Watersheds and the Delta for 2015, (2) 2015 water right curtailments, (3) current and historical BBID diversions, and (4) documents relied upon by Marshall in forming his testimony and/or referring to his testimony. (Vergara Decl., Exh. G.) This enforcement action is about the SWRCB's

2015 water right curtailments based on its statewide and region-specific water availability analyses, which is in part informed by BBID's current and historical diversions.

Certainly, the categories of documents have a tendency to prove or disprove disputed facts in this matter. Moreover, BBID is entitled to production of all documents relied upon by Marshall in forming his opinions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210(c).)

Further, the standard for production of documents at the discovery stage is whether the documents sought are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence – not whether they are actually admissible at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) It is improper to assert "relevance" as a justification for refusing to produce documents unless the categories sought are blatantly unrelated to the issues. That is not the case with BBID's document requests and DWR's refusal to produce documents that, at a minimum, are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is an abuse of the discovery process.

E. Marshall's Lack of Control or Possession of Some Documents Does Not Negate BBID's Right to Discovery

DWR claims that some of the documents sought by BBID are not within Marshall's possession or control. However, the Code of Civil Procedure allows for the discovery of documents in each *party's* possession or control, not limited to documents in a *deponent's* possession and control. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010, subd. (a).) Marshall is a DWR employee and is being offered by DWR as its representative expert witness in this proceeding. This means that discovery encompasses DWR's documents, not just Marshall's. The fact that the deposition notice may seek documents that go beyond what is in his immediate possession and may instead be in the possession of other DWR representatives is not objectional. BBID is entitled to discover reports and writings created by the expert to prepare the expert's opinion (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210) and discovery that is admissible or "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

F. BBID is Not Required to Conduct its Pre-Hearing Expert Discovery During the Hearing Itself

DWR repeatedly argues that Marshall's deposition is unnecessary and duplicative because BBID will have the opportunity to cross-examine Marshall at the hearing. DWR claims that questioning Marshall through cross-examination would be more convenient, less burdensome, and less expensive than a deposition. DWR fails to mention that it would also be less effective and highly prejudicial.

Marshall's rebuttal testimony presents new evidence based on modeling simulations and conclusions deriving therefrom. BBID is entitled to gain an understanding of the basis for Marshall's opinions and documents in support of the same to be able to develop a proper cross-examination approach for purposes of the hearing. Going through this type of questioning takes time, which is conducive to the structure and process of depositions. The parties' time at the hearing is limited, such that it is unreasonable and prejudicial for BBID to use its limited time for a line of questioning that could occur before the hearing. Questioning Marshall at a deposition will allow BBID to conduct a more efficient and targeted cross-examination at the hearing, and will prevent spending limited hearing time on questioning that could have occurred weeks in advance.

G. The Proposed Discovery Does Not Expand the Scope of Marshall's Rebuttal Testimony or Scope of the Hearing

DWR claims that allowing BBID to depose Marshall will increase the likelihood of inappropriately expanding the scope of the hearing. As an example, DWR states that BBID intends to question Marshall beyond the bounds of his rebuttal testimony and on facts, opinions, or documents that relate to his testimony. The argument is nonsensical at best, given the fact that the entire purpose of an expert deposition is to garner all of the facts, opinions, or documents that an expert relied on, which necessarily includes testing that opinion with questions "related" to the testimony.

BBID, through its deposition notice, proposes to depose Marshall just as it would any other case-in-chief witness. BBID is allowed to discover evidence that is admissible or "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) BBID deposed many witnesses on topics including the witness' experience and job duties, water availability, water right curtailments, BBID's diversions, and preparation for the enforcement action. Marshall is no different. Moreover, DWR has the right to assert objections during the course of the deposition and certainly the Hearing Officer has the power to control the scope of testimony permitted during the hearing.

H. DWR's Alternative Request to Limit the Scope of Marshall's Deposition and Document Production is Unfounded

DWR's alternative request to limit the scope of Marshall's deposition and document production is unfounded and must be denied. BBID has a statutory right to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action[.]" (*Ibid.*) For the reasons discussed herein above, DWR fails to set forth any facts or legal arguments to reasonably justify any curtailment of BBID's discovery rights. BBID is entitled to prepare its defense and as long as DWR intends to utilize Marshall to support the prosecution efforts against BBID, DWR and Marshall should not be shielded from any aspect of the discovery process.

VII. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the foregoing reasons, BBID respectfully requests the SWRCB deny DWR's Motion for Protective Order and allow the deposition of Marshall to proceed as noticed. BBID alternatively requests that the hearing be continued by at least 30 days to allow sufficient time for the parties to complete this critical discovery.

Dated:March 4, 2016

SOMACH/SIMMONS & DUNN A Professional Corporation

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Michael Vergara, Esq.

Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION DISTRICT

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Sacramento; my business address is 500 Capitol Mall, Suite 1000, Sacramento, California; I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the foregoing action.

On March 4, 2016, I served the following document(s):

BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S OPPOSITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

X (via electronic mail) by causing to be delivered a true copy thereof to the person(s) and at the email addresses set forth below:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 4, 2016 at Sacramento, California.

Yolanda De La Cruz

SOMACH SIMMONS & DUNN A Professional Corporation

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SERVICE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL LIABILITY HEARING (Revised 9/2/15; Revised: 9/11/15)

3	(Nevised 9/2/13, Nevised. 9/11/13)		
	VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL	VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL	
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	VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL	VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL	
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10	Banta-Carbona Irrigation District The West Side Irrigation District	Jonathan Knapp Office of the City Attorney	
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SERVICE LIST WEST SIDE IRRIGATION DISTRICT CEASE AND DESIST ORDER HEARING

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BYRON-BETHANY IRRIGATION DISTRICT'S OPPOSITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES' MOTION FOR PROECTIVE ORDER; RE: PAUL MARSHALL